Progressive Action for the Common Good (PACG)
has reserved a passenger van to transport Quad City activists to Des Moines next Monday, January
29th. We will be joining other progressive activists across Iowa in order to lobby our
state legislators on the importance of clean elections and public
financing of campaigns. Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement (ICCI)
is the main organizer of this event and has already laid a lot of
groundwork around this issue. This is a price-less (pun intended)
opportunity to make a difference in the fight to reclaim our democracy.
Monday's Agenda:
We will leave from the NE corner of the Northpark Mall parking lot
(near Sears) at 8:00am. This van seats 12. We have 6 open seats available and will be stopping at the Perkins restaturant in Iowa City to pick up a couple more folks so if you live in the QC area or in Iowa City and would like to join us, please contact Caroline ASAP to reserve a
seat: 563-676-7580,
carolina1961@gmail.com. Others from the QC area will also be carpooling to Des Moines.
Please wear a green shirt (representing money) and if possible, bring a
dozen or more home-made cookies along. Currently, lobbyists are allowed
to spend a maximum of $2.99 on each legislator so we would like to
bring home-made cookies to share, to represent home-made elections. If
you are willing to contribute goodies for the cause please let me know.
If you are unable to attend, but would be willing to bake some cookies,
that would be terrific! Finally, to help defray some of the cost of
renting the bus, we are asking for a $10 donation from each
participant.
Once
we get to the Capitol, we will debrief at 11am to go over our talking
points and the day's activities. At noon, we will participate in a
rally and press conference. Former Congressman Berkley Bedell, Ed
Fallon, Pam Yoakum, and Mike Connelly will all speak to the importance
of voter-owned clean elections. From 12:30 to 3pm, we will all have an
opportunity to lobby each of our state reps on this issue. We will then
plan to leave Des Moines promptly by 3:15pm so we can return home in time for
dinner, around 6pm.
CCI is expecting an estimated turnout of
close to 150 activists from around the state. I am hopeful that we can fill the remaining seats in the van. We
expect to have a bill number to lobby around by next week.
Thanks for all you do - hope to see you in Des Moines! Caroline Vernon 563-676-7580
carolina1961@gmail.com
For more information on why this issue is so important, please read the following:
Are Political Action Committees trying to use money to influence OUR legislature?
Iowans shouldn't have to wonder.
Tell your legislators to support Voter Owned Iowa Clean Elections!
The
Clean Elections Act will help restore fairness to our elections by
allowing everyday Iowans the opportunity to run for office, regardless
of how much money they can access. Voters won't have to wonder if
large contributors are gaining unbalanced access to OUR
representatives.
The Clean Elections Act would provide a limited amount of public financing for candidates
who:
Pledge to not raise any private money for their campaigns. Pledge to not use any of their own money for their campaigns.
Collect a set number of signatures and $5 contributions from within their own district to prove they are viable.
It Can Work! Maine and Arizona have been effectively using the system for four election cycles and the results have been good for democracy.
More people are running for office. More people are turning out to vote. Candidates report spending more time talking to voters. 9
of 11 statewide officeholders in Arizona, including the Governor and
Attorney General, have been elected without taking money from PACs and
big money contributors, spending only a fraction of what is used in
conventional races like Iowa's.
We Need it Now! Voter-Owned Elections help ensure a healthy democracy by:
Freeing candidates from the money chase and allowing them to spend all their campaign time talking with voters.
Creating a fair playing field by reducing the need to raise large amounts of money to win.
Giving
more Iowans the chance to run for office – regardless of their access
to big money or their willingness to accept PAC contributions.
Creating
a system where Iowans won't have to wonder if big contributions are
influencing votes at the capitol with their campaign contributions.
The Clean Elections Act = Voter Owned Iowa Clean Elections
Background:
A
Clean Elections Act would create voluntary public financing for state
elections. Candidates would qualify for public funding if they vowed
to raise no private money, vowed to not use any of their own money, and
collected a set number of signatures and $5 contributions from within
their district.
In a contested general election, eligible candidates who chose to use the system would receive:
$3 million for a team running for governor and lieutenant governor. $200,000 for a candidate for attorney general.
$125,000 for a candidate for a statewide office other than governor, lieutenant governor, or attorney general. $40,000 for a candidate for the Iowa senate. $30,000 for a candidate for the Iowa house or representatives.
Summary:
Voter
Owned Iowa Clean Elections is a system that would free candidates from
the money chase and allow them to spend more time with voters and
constituents. The same system has been used in Maine and Arizona for
four full election cycles and has proven to be an effective way of
reducing the influence of big money on elections. 6 of 8 statewide
office holders in Arizona were elected without using any special
interest money. Voter turnout has increased by over 20%. The number
of people running for office has increased. And in the Nov 2006
Election, Governor Janet Napolitano won re-election, combining with her
challenger to spend only $2 million, compared to the combined $18
million spent by candidates in the Iowa gubernatorial race.
A
Clean Elections Act will allow every day Iowans to run for office
without having to worry about raising large amounts of money. Phase I
of CCI's "Money and Elections in Iowa" study shows that the majority of
money given to candidates is coming from PACs. Challengers are at a
huge disadvantage, needing to raise $65,000 to be competitive in a race
for the house and $100,000 to be competitive for the senate. And as
campaign spending has gotten out of control, campaigns have gone south.
The Clean Elections Act would limit unnecessary spending by placing
contribution limits on donors. The Clean Elections Act would also
require Media outlets to file reports outlining who is paying for
political advertisements, curbing the explosion of negative
advertising.
For the cost of $5 per voter, Iowans could know for certain
that their elected officials are working to address the needs of all
Iowans, and not have to wonder about where all the money comes from.
For around $10 million a year, our state elected officials would have
the chance to focus on ideas and meeting their constituents, not
chasing down the combined $32 million spent in the Nov. 2006 elections.
Tell your legislator today: "Iowans want Voter Owned Clean Elections!"
GAO Report Finds Flaws in Electronic Voting t r u t h o u t | Report
Thank
God! The truth comes out! I knew they cheated in the last election...
was there ever really any doubt? GWB was never legitimately elected...
not the first time, and not the second time. My question is, how could
any of our own Representatives have voted against verifiable paper
trails? And when will the rest of us hold them accountable?
Friday 21 October 2005
Rep.
Waxman led twelve members of Congress today in releasing a new GAO
report that found security and reliability flaws in the electronic
voting process.
In a
joint press release, Rep. Waxman said, "The GAO report indicates that
we need to get serious and act quickly to improve the security of
electronic voting machines. The report makes clear that there is a lack
of transparency and accountability in electronic voting systems - from
the day that contracts are signed with manufacturers to the counting of
electronic votes on Election Day. State and local officials are
spending a great deal of money on machines without concrete proof that
they are secure and reliable."
The GAO
report found flaws in security, access, and hardware controls, as well
as weak security management practices by voting machine vendors. The
report identified multiple examples of actual operational failures in
real elections and found that while national initiatives to improve the
security and reliability of electronic voting systems are underway, "it
is unclear when these initiatives will be available to assist state and
local election authorities."
Rep. Waxman also released a fact sheet summarizing the report's key findings.
Fact Sheet
Overall Findings
In
October 2005, the Government Accountability Office released a
comprehensive analysis of the concerns raised by the increasing use of
electronic voting machines.
Overall,
GAO found that "significant concerns about the security and reliability
of electronic voting systems" have been raised (p. 22).
GAO
indicated that "some of these concerns have been realized and have
caused problems with recent elections, resulting in the loss and
miscount of votes" (p. 23).
According
to GAO, "election officials, computer security experts, citizen
advocacy groups, and others have raised significant concerns about the
security and reliability of electronic voting systems, citing instances
of weak security controls, system design flaws, inadequate system
version control, inadequate security testing, incorrect system
configuration, poor security management, and vague or incomplete
standards, among other issues. ... The security and reliability
concerns raised in recent reports merit the focused attention of
federal, state, and local authorities responsible for election
administration" (p. 22-23).
Specific Problems Identified by GAO
Based on
reports from election experts, GAO compiled numerous examples of
problems with electronic voting systems. These included:
Flaws in System Security Controls
Examples
of problems reported by GAO include (1) computer systems that fail to
encrypt data files containing cast votes, allowing them to be viewed or
modified without detection by internal auditing systems; (2) systems
that could allow individuals to alter ballot definition files so that
votes cast for one candidate are counted for another; and (3) weak
controls that allowed the alteration of memory cards used in optical
scan machines, potentially impacting election results. GAO concluded
that "these weaknesses could damage the integrity of ballots, votes,
and voting system software by allowing unauthorized modifications (p.
25).
Flaws in Access Controls
Examples
of problems reported by GAO include (1) the failure to password-protect
files and functions; (2) the use of easily guessed passwords or
identical passwords for numerous systems built by the same
manufacturer; and (3) the failure to secure memory cards used to secure
voting systems, potentially allowing individuals to vote multiple
times, change vote totals, or produce false election reports.
According
to GAO, "in the event of lax supervision, the ... flaws could allow
unauthorized personnel to disrupt operations or modify data and
programs that are crucial to the accuracy and integrity of the voting
process" (p. 26).
Flaws in Physical Hardware Controls
In
addition to identifying flaws in software and access controls, GAO
identified basic problems with the physical hardware of electronic
voting machines. Example of problems reported by GAO included locks
that could be easily picked or were all controlled by the same keys,
and unprotected switches used to turn machines on and off that could
easily be used to disrupt the voting process (p. 27).
Weak Security Management Practices by Voting Machine Vendors
Experts
contacted by GAO reported a number of concerns about the practices of
voting machine vendors, including the failure to conduct background
checks on programmers and system developers, the lack of internal
security protocols during software development, and the failure to
establish clear chain of custody procedures for handling and
transporting software (p. 29).
Actual Examples of Voting System Failure
GAO found multiple examples of actual operational failures in real elections. These examples include the following incidents:
In
California, a county presented voters with an incorrect electronic
ballot, meaning they could not vote in certain races (p. 29).
In
Pennsylvania, a county made a ballot error on an electronic voting
system that resulted in the county's undervote percentage reaching 80%
in some precincts (p. 29-30).
In North
Carolina, electronic voting machines continued to accept votes after
their memories were full, causing over 4,000 votes to be lost (p. 31).
In
Florida, a county reported that touch screens took up to an hour to
activate and had to be activated sequentially, resulting in long delays
(p. 31). Current Federal Standards and Initiatives Are Ineffective and Are Unlikely to Provide Solutions in a Timely Fashion
GAO
reported that voluntary standards for electronic voting, adopted in
2002 by the Federal Election Commission, have been criticized for
containing vague and incomplete security provisions, inadequate
provisions for commercial products and networks, and inadequate
documentation requirements (pp. 32-33).
GAO
further reported that "security experts and some election officials
have expressed concern that tests currently performed by independent
testing authorities and state and local election officials do not
adequately assess electronic voting system security and reliability,"
and that "these concerns are amplified by what some perceive as a lack
of transparency in the testing process" (p. 34). The GAO report
indicated that national initiatives to improve voting system security
and reliability of electronic voting systems (such as updated standards
from the Election Assistance Commission; federal accreditation of
independent testing laboratories; and certification of voting systems
to national standards) are underway, but " a majority of these efforts
either lack specific plans for implementation in time to affect the
2006 general election or are not expected to be completed until after
the 2006 election" (p. 43). As a result, GAO found that "it is unclear
when these initiatives will be available to assist state and local
election officials" (p. 43). According to GAO, "Until these efforts are
completed, there is a risk that many state and local jurisdictions will
rely on voting systems that were not developed, acquired, tested,
operated, or managed in accordance with rigorous security and
reliability standards - potentially affecting the reliability of future
elections and voter confidence in the accuracy of the vote count" (p.
53).
The Death of Democracy: End-game Ohio by Caroline Vernon
US Democracy would appear to be a fiction, not only because of the war,
but because of the mounting evidence of the election theft in Ohio, and
other parts of the nation.
Here are excerpts from a long and detailed article on the subject.
Interesting that we have to go to Canada to get this article. If you listen to US news only, you might just end up accepting the fiction that Bush was democratically elected President.
------ The Strange Death of American Democracy: Endgame in Ohio
by Michael Keefer
University of Guelph (Ontario, Canada) Associate Professor of English
Michael Keefer writes: So who ever thought the 2004 US presidential
election had the remotest chance of being honest and democratic?
. . . . Ohio was the swing state of swing states on November 2nd, 2004,
the one whose twenty Electoral College votes decided the outcome of the
US presidential election. It is therefore a matter of some significance
that the testimonial evidence of corruption in the Ohio election is
corroborated by statistical evidence which shows the election in this
state - and nationwide - to have been not just corrupt, but stolen.
The evidence in both categories is massively complex. But thanks to the
no less massive analytical labors over the past two months of citizen
pro-democracy activists, of social scientists, of mathematicians and
statisticians, of computer programmers, and of alternative-media
investigative journalists, it can nonetheless be conveniently
summarized.
You want smoking guns? Here they are, starting with the evidence that
John F. Kerry, and not George W. Bush, won the state of Ohio. 1. Uncounted punch-card and provisional ballots.
Well over 13,000 Ohio provisional ballots were never counted, and
92,672 regular punch-card ballots were set aside by vote-counting
machines as indicating no choice for president. Thus, even after Ohio's
supposed recount, a total of over 106,000 ballots remained
uncounted--though there was no legal reason for not inspecting
and counting each of these ballots. But there seems to have been
a very good political reason for not doing so: the uncounted ballots
came disproportionately from places like the cities of Cincinnati,
Cleveland and Akron, all of which voted overwhelmingly for the
Democrats. 2. Fraud through default settings on touch-screen voting machines.
Some 15 percent of Ohio's votes were cast using the new touch-screen
voting machines. In the city of Youngstown, in Mahoning County, there
were repeated complaints about what election observers referred to
as vote-flipping by the ES&S Ivotronic touch-screen
machines used there. This flipping phenomenon, also widely
observed in other states, typically appeared to poll watchers
like a mere computer glitch, no different than a super market checkout
machine that records an incorrect price for lettuce.
But what was happening, in the vast majority of cases, was no
glitch. As Dom Stasi notes, The laws of probability demand
that multiple random errors trend toward even distribution, but only if
they are truly errors. Yet in all of the published accounts of
vote flipping, the errors consistently favored Bush: voters
who were trying to vote for Kerry found their votes being given to
Bush, transferred to third-party candidates, or simply erased. The
Chairman of the Mahoning County Board of Elections is reported to have
stated that 20 to 30 machines [...] needed to be re-calibrated
during the voting process. He is not quoted as saying that any
action was taken, or could be taken, to compensate for the machines'
one-way errors - and there is evidence that many other machines were
left uncorrected.
To read the entire article: Click Here
Iowa and the Death of Democracy Culver Asks Iowa Legislature to Pass Elections Bill
(DES MOINES, IA) Secretary of State Chet Culver [Monday] released
data submitted by county officials showing that nearly half of Iowa’s
counties will purchase touch-screen voting machines as part of
statewide efforts to upgrade voting machines and make election system
improvements as required by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).
“The timing is critical,” Culver said. “Legislators have put
together an elections bill that has many outstanding provisions, but
legislators have not yet voted on the bill. I urge them to do
so. County supervisors and election officials are dealing with
election reforms right now and are ready to purchase new voting
machines, which means proposed changes in state law will do the most
good if they can take effect this year.”
Earlier in the session the Iowa Senate voted 48-0 in favor of a voter
verified paper trail. Some lawmakers raised concerns about the
technology, which has improved to take effect as Iowa and other states
prepare for new voting systems that must be in place by 2006.
Culver said he has been assured by voting equipment manufacturers that
the technology is available to meet a paper trail requirement.
For added reassurance, Senator Jeff Danielson of Cedar Falls proposed
an amendment to the bill that would put the onus on equipment vendors
and the Secretary of State’s office to complete certification for
touch-screen voting machines with paper trail features by no later than
August 15, 2005.
“If the requirement doesn’t become law now, it may be another decade or
more before counties purchase new voting equipment. Furthermore,
HAVA provides our counties with a one-time use of federal dollars to
support a large share of the equipment costs,” Culver said.
Supporters of the elections bill include the League of Women Voters of
Iowa, AARP, Democracy for Iowa, I-Vote, and other citizen groups. In addition to the
paper trail issue, the elections bill includes other provisions that
Culver said will give local officials more flexibility and a greater
ability to reduce local election costs.
Myth Breakers: A non-partisan national grassroots
resource for fair and accurate elections!
Information is power. Learn the facts. Myth Breakers... - Corrects HAVA misconceptions - Describes HAVA-compliant
alternatives to DREs - Gives general pricing information - Speaks about
myth vs. misinformation
The second edition includes... -
Malfunctions from the 2004 General Election - More about testing and
certification - Details about software complexities
Myth Breakers is a tool for
citizen activists. Myth
Breakers will enable you to speak with confidence about the issues. Then
... Spread
the Truth! Deliver "Myth Breakers: Facts about Electronic Elections" to
your local election officials and legislators. Give them the information they
need to make wise decisions.
Participants have confirmed that the first edition ("Myth Breakers for
Election Officials") has been delivered to 838
local election officials (including, in 2004, all 99 Iowa counties,
which makes it all the more heartbreaking that so many Iowa county
auditors have chosen to ignore the disturbing facts).
Project Mythbreaker in Iowa: DELIVERED! This report came in today from Dr. Alta Price of Bettendorf, DFIA’s Project Mythbreaker coordinator:
Democracy
for Iowa has now coordinated delivery of "Myth Breakers for Election
Officials" to all 99 Iowa Counties, as well as to Chet Culver's office.
As far as I can tell, we are the only DFA group to have undertaken such
an ambitious project to ensure fair elections in their state. Check out
the first website below to see us listed as the contact group in Iowa.
The second website is my personal favorite. Look at all the little gold
stars we got! LOL
Alta Price And boy, did Alta ever earn us those gold stars! In case you didn’t get the chance to read our report to DFA which was posted on Blog for America two weeks ago, here’s the rest of the Project Mythbreaker in Iowa story:
Our next big project, [begun in April,] was through the non-partisan fair elections organization VotersUnite! VotersUnite! is run by Ellen Theisen, former Executive Director of VerifiedVoting.org. Ellen has written the quintessential handbook on the subject of touch-screen voting, called Myth Breakers for Election Officials,
so Democracy for Iowa set out to print out and hand-deliver a copy of
this tome to the county auditor in each of Iowa’s 99 counties.
We had our big launch and got some press coverage
thanks to Alta and her press release. [At that point, we had
delivered to 19 Iowa counties.] In the end, Alta decided to go
right to the source: The Iowa State Association of Counties (ISAC)
Summer School. She printed up 100 copies [since the materials had
been updated 3 times since we first set out delivering the booklets]
along with the more recent findings about the ES&S system flaws,
and had them delivered directly to the registration desk at the ISAC
meeting with the help of the Scott County Auditor, Karen Fitzsimmons,
and the Deputy Auditor of Clinton County, Betsy Smith. Alta had
labeled each booklet with the name of the county so we could track
them. Ultimately, we only received 12 of the booklets back, and
heard reports that no one was listening to the speakers because they
were too engrossed in reading Myth Breakers! [And, as Alta reported
above, the remaining booklets have now been shipped off to the election
officials in the appropriate counties!]
Well done, Alta! We are so proud of all your hard work and your determination to make a difference in Iowa.
Call to Action: Insist on Hand Counted Paper Ballots for Federal Offices A Message from VotersUnite! in partnership with the National Ballot Integrity Project
Write to
Senators Harkin and Grassley and to your representative in Congress and
ask them to support the Federal Paper Ballot Act of 2004.
Federal Paper Ballot Act of 2004
(1) All votes for federal offices shall be cast on paper ballots.
(2) All
votes for federal offices shall be hand counted at the polling places
where the votes were cast, and the manual count shall constitute the
official count of the votes.
(3)
Manually-tallied precinct totals for all federal offices shall be
prominently posted at the polling places before the ballots are
transported to the central facility.
(4) In
any jurisdiction where votes for federal office are also counted by
machine, the machine totals for federal offices shall be posted at the
location where the votes are machine-counted.
(5) All
absentee votes for federal offices shall be counted by hand, and the
totals shall be posted at the central election office.
(6) This act is effective on the date of enactment.
Insist that your legislators understand ... ... a questionable, unauditable election in November could lead to massive court challenges and tear the country apart.
... an electronic federal election will result in a national crisis in November, regardless of the election outcome.
... it is the responsibility of Congress to avert a national crisis. This legislation will avert that crisis.
... you will not cast your vote for them in November unless they support this legislation.
Insist that they introduce and support the Federal Paper Ballot Act of 2004. Click here for Senator Tom Harkin's email form.
Click here for Senator Chuck "I vote with the junta" Grassley's email form.
Click here for the form to write your representative in Congress. Just enter your zip code to get the webform of the right dude.
Emergency Measures to Protect the 2004 Vote Count A Message from VotersUnite! in partnership with the National Ballot Integrity Project
Protect the 2004 Vote Count!
Transparency
means that ALL election processes can be observed by ordinary people -
that people can observe the process of counting votes, not just observe
computers processing votes. Transparent procedures will:
- Increase the likelihood of an accurate vote count. - Avert a questionable federal election and national crisis. - Reduce the potential for legal challenges to the elections in November.
Meet with your county leaders
and propose that votes for federal offices be manually counted as an
emergency measure to protect the accuracy of the vote count and protect
the county from legal challenges.
Emergency Measures To Protect The 2004 Vote Count These
measures will help assure voters that votes were counted correctly and
will help protect counties from potential legal challenges to their
elections.
Please work to implement them in your county. a.
All votes for federal offices will be counted by hand, in public view,
at the polling place before they are transmitted or transported to a
central facility. b.
Precinct totals will be prominently posted at the polling place before
the ballots are transmitted or transported to a central facility. c.
Ballots may be counted and aggregated electronically, in addition to
the hand-count. However, in any case where a discrepancy exists, the
hand-count will be considered the official result. Talking Points
*Both major parties are forming networks of lawyers ready to challenge
questionable results. By conducting a manual count of votes for federal
office, counties can protect themselves from potential legal action.
*Voter-confidence is at an all-time low. By doing this manual count,
they can assure their constituents that the votes have been counted
correctly.
*It would take less than an hour in each precinct and could potentially
save the county hundreds of hours defending themselves in court or
confirming results by doing full recounts.
*In paperless precincts, it would require nothing more than the
addition of simple, inexpensive ballots able to handle a maximum of
four federal offices. The cost might be as low as 5 cents a ballot, if
they were printed at a local printer on cheap paper. For additional procedures for optical scan voting machines, click here.
Tomorrow, Blog for Iowa will go into detail about how you can contact your Senators and your Congressman about this issue.
*IBLTV is a group of citizens from the Iowa City/Cedar Rapids area who are concerned about the decline in the quality of local television. Fight local media consolidation, as it leads to an unaccountable medium that enriches itself while disregarding the need to serve the public good.
*The rational counter to 'The Point,' 'The Counterpoint' critiques and corrects the daily editorial by Sinclair Broadcasting's corporate vice president, Mark Hyman, that is broadcast on all Sinclair-owned television stations across the country
ICCI Voter Owned Lobby Day in Des Moines
GAO Report Finds Flaws in Electronic Voting 
Iowa and the Death of Democracy