Caliornia's Voting Machine Review Shows Iowa Needs Needs to Do More to Protect the Vote

By Sean Flaherty, IVI


Dear Iowa Voters,

This month California completed a top-to-bottom review of its voting systems, and concluded that the same Diebold touchscreen voting machines used in 71 Iowa counties are not secure enough to use as a primary voting system. The review also calls Diebold's suite of election systems "an oceanliner built without watertight doors." Click here to read more about the review's findings.

California Secretary of State Debra Bowen has decided to severely restrict the use of touchscreens.

Bowen's decision reminds us that Iowans need to finish what we started, and replace touchscreen voting machines with voter-marked paper ballots.

17 Iowa counties use Diebold touchscreens as the only system at the polling place, and another 54 use both Diebold's touchscreens and their paper ballot scanners.

Contact Governor Culver, and let him know that Iowa should fund the purchase of paper ballot systems, with optical scanners and ballot-marking devices to serve voters with disabilities.   A sample letter is at the end of this alert.

Governor Culver signed our new paper ballot law last May, which transitions the state gradually to optical scan and ballot-marking devices. Counties can use touchscreens until they wear out, or until they decide to replace their voting system. Florida is making a faster switch to paper ballots, with Maryland and Virginia following. 17 states already use only voter-marked paper ballots in their elections.

Only $2 million was allocated for Iowa counties to buy new systems, though, and a full conversion to paper ballots and optical scan could cost up to $10 million.  Let the Governor know that the state should finish the job, and make the necessary funds available to counties to replace touchscreens. Click here for more talking points on paper-ballot vs. touchscreen systems.


Background on the Diebold Report
"We are not optimistic that stricter chain-of-custody controls will prove effective in addressing the vulnerabilities identified in this report."1

The above is a quote from California's expert team that studied the computer code of the same Diebold voting systems used in 71 Iowa counties. The review team, led by David Wagner of the University of California-Berkeley, also compares the systems to “an oceanliner built without watertight doors.”2  Election results can be corrupted on this equipment.

All Diebold equipment, including its ballot scanner, has grave problems. But at least with paper ballots, we have a clear record of the voter's intent.

The touchscreen's voter-verifiable paper trail is likely to go unchecked too often, while paper ballots are inherently voter-verified. Diebold's touchscreen stores votes electronically with a timestamp, threatening ballot secrecy. Its security is also worse than that of the Diebold ballot scanner, allowing corruption that would "be very difficult to disinfect with confidence" (page 22 of the source code review).

California is also planning a similar review of Iowa's only other voting system vendor, Election Systems and Software (ES&S). ES&S did not provide its code or equipment in time for this review, though the security of its iVotronic touchscreen (the voting machine that made Sarasota, Florida the election meltdown of 2006) has been severely criticized by computer scientists.

Testing that is done before an election offers little defense against software manipulation; well-designed malicious code can avoid testing conditions, by running only when a certain number of ballots have been run, by running only when the machine has been in use for a period longer than a typical test, and other conditions (page 58 of the source code review, and pages 43-44 of the 2006 Brennan Center report).

Another often-heard argument, that election officials can guard against tampering with a strict chain of custody, simply does not hold up.  Iowa has great election officials, but the weaknesses of these machines require absolute trust in all who have access to them. We should trust the process, not individuals.

And as the Carter-Baker Commission noted in 2005, even perfect security in an election office does not guard against tampering by insiders of a voting machine company.  Insider fraud has, of course, occurred in other industries, including the financial services industry.  The Carter-Baker Commission wrote:
“There is no reason to trust insiders in the election industry more than in other industries, such as gambling, where sophisticated insider fraud has occurred despite extraordinary measures to prevent it.”

There is a lot for Iowans to take from the California report, and from Secretary of State Bowen's decisions. She is also developing new standards for post-election hand counts to verify electronic tallies. Hand-count audits are as essential as any measure to protect the vote, and Iowa does not do them yet. That will be our next big step.

Educating your county Auditor about the Diebold report is another great step to take - if you live in a county that uses Diebold.  Click here to see if your county uses Diebold, and find your county Auditor's contact information here.  The two points to drive home: chain of custody cannot be made secure enough with these systems, and pre-election testing does not do much do much to detect software manipulation.

But first things first:  we need funding to replace direct-recording electronic touchscreens.  A sample letter  to the Governor is below.  Your own language is best, so use this as a template.

Click here to view all the California Secretary of State's reports.

There is more work to do to verify our elections, but we continue to win, step by step. Help us keep on this winning streak for verified voting.

Thank you for all you do.

Best regards,
Sean Flaherty
Co-Chair, Iowans for Voting Integrity
www.IowansForVotingIntegrity.org


1“Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System,” David Wagner and colleagues, p. 58

2“”, p. 20

Contact Information for the Governor
Office of The Governor and Lt. Governor
State Capitol
Des Moines, IA 50319
515.281.5211
E-mail form:

Sample Letter

Dear Governor Culver,

Thank you for signing legislation to move the state toward voter-marked paper ballots with optical scanners.  Iowa joins a number of states, including Florida, in moving to adopt the voting system that offers the best record of the voter's intent.  Counties need funding to make this conversion, though. The $2 million budgeted for new equipment this year is only a start.

The recent review of voting systems by California's Secretary of State confirms that the nationwide experiment with touchscreen voting should come to an end.  California is ending the use of Diebold touchscreens as a primary voting system, due to fundamental and  unacceptable security vulnerabilities

Please consult with Secretary of State Mauro and the Assembly, and budget the necessary funds for Iowa to provide all of its voters with voting systems that preserve the intent of the voters.

Respectfully,

Your Name Here